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The Industrialization of “Liberal Medicine” in 
France. A Labor Quality Conventions Approach 
Nicolas Da Silva  
Abstract: »Die Industrialisierung der „liberalen Medizin“ in Frankreich. Zur Ana-
lyse der Qualitätskonventionen der Arbeit«. This article seeks to analyze the 
evolution of the regulation of liberal medicine in France from the theoretical 
framework of the economics of convention. The recent introduction by the 
state of multiple management devices aimed at quantifying and evaluating 
the performance of physicians could be interpreted as a process of rationali-
zation of medical practices. However, we propose to analyze the transfor-
mations in the regulation of liberal medicine as the transition from an in-
spired/domestic convention of healthcare quality to an industrial convention 
of healthcare quality. What is at stake is not improving the quality of care, but 
changing the conception of quality. Do doctors treat sick people or illnesses? 
This induces significant changes not only in the entire healthcare system but 
also in medical ethics. While the profession has historically been built against 
the market, it seems that the industrialization of healthcare opens the door 
to its commodification.  
Keywords: Economics of convention, industrialization, liberal medicine, pay 
for performance, medical ethics. 
1. Introduction 
French health system reforms since the 1980s/1990s are revolutionizing the 
organization of healthcare work. The work of healthcare personnel is being 
increasingly standardized and regulated to enhance productivity. This reor-
ganization of work is grounded in fuzzy theoretical concepts of New Public 
Management and requires the introduction of quantified quality standards by 
which to gauge healthcare output. The basic idea is that the old ways of or-
ganizing and financing work that valued autonomy actually promoted worker 
opportunism. By quantifying and overseeing work, one can supposedly tap 
into reserves of productivity. Work is overseen so as to improve healthcare 
quality and to optimize spending in times of budget austerity. In healthcare, 
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as is the case elsewhere, workers are under statistical and bureaucratic pres-
sure (Bruno and Didier 2013; Hibou 2012). 
Despite the proliferation of healthcare quality standards (Setbon 2000), 
greater suffering is observed among health professionals who complain they 
are unable to do their work as they should. France is experiencing a “hospital 
crisis” which is now acknowledged and goes back a long way. Back in 2013, 
for example, the doctors’ collective “Docteur Blouses”1 rejected “the industri-
alization of healthcare of these last decades conducted in the name of budg-
etary logic with the tools of new public management and with a view to com-
modification because it is done to the detriment of patients” (Docteur Blouses 
2013, 54). The social movement that arose in the hospital sector in 2019 
around a throng of collectives (Inter-Hôpitaux, Inter-Urgences, Inter-Bloc, In-
firmières en colère, Blouses noires,2 etc.) similarly points out the incompatibility 
between healthcare as a profession and the industrialization of practices. In 
its founding motion, the Collectif Inter-Hôpitaux calls for an “emergency 
scheme for hospitals across the board” and its first point refutes that 
healthcare delivery can be likened to “an industrial production line”: such a 
claim being incompatible with “the hospital service’s mission of care provi-
sion for all” (Collectif Inter-Hôpitaux 2019). 
The proliferation of quantified healthcare quality standards and the many 
associated management mechanisms is part and parcel of the industrializa-
tion of healthcare work (Da Silva 2018; Da Silva and Rauly 2016). Industriali-
zation of healthcare can be defined as a process aimed at founding profes-
sional practice on compliance with quantified standards. Industrialization 
seeks, then, to strip away all autonomy from work, specifically by denying 
professionals the possibility of defining “good” practice for themselves. This 
involves laying down standards, ensuring that professionals comply with 
them, and, as need be, imposing sanctions for departing from them. How-
ever, the industrialization of healthcare causes suffering at work because it 
denies all the wealth of healthcare work and that there are incommensurable 
and competing conceptions of “doing a good job,” of quality.3 
In the theoretical language used in the economics of convention (box 1), it 
can be said that there are different conventions of healthcare quality, one of 
them being the industrial convention which does not value things that do not 
count and/or things one does not seek to count. Accordingly, everything that 
is invaluable in the healthcare relationship, the things that count because 
they cannot be counted (Chanial 2010; Molinier 2013), loses its legitimacy, in 
 
1  “Blouses” is the name for the white coats carers wear. In French, it sounds similar to the musical 
genre the “blues” with its connotation of sadness and melancholy.  
2  Respectively: cross-hospital, cross-emergency, cross-operating room, angry nurses, black coats 
(mental health workers). 
3  Obviously, the industrialization of work is not a new problem nor is the resulting depletion in its 
worth.  
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contradiction with professionals’ traditional conceptions. The industrial con-
vention cannot take account of time unaccounted for, attentiveness, altruism, 
empathy, and so on, or worse still, it counts it as waste to be cut to the mini-
mum. The contradiction between the way professionals think of their work 
and what they are told to do lies at the root of much of the suffering at work 
(Dejours 1998; Benallah and Domin 2017). 
This paper examines the industrialization of healthcare in “liberal medi-
cine” in France on the basis of the economics of convention. The industriali-
zation of healthcare may be construed as the transition from an inspired/do-
mestic convention (1.) to an industrial convention of healthcare quality (2.). 
Contrary to what is heard in public debate, industrialization is not rationali-
zation and it overturns medical values (3.) by promoting the prospect of an 
industrial/market compromise. 
Box 1: The Quality Convention Notion 
In health economics, there are non-standard approaches that emphasize the role of 
institutions by highlighting social rules whether formal (especially legal rules) or infor-
mal (customs, traditions, habits, or conventions). In healthcare, one institutional ap-
proach, the economics of convention, emphasizes the role of “values” in accounting 
for the specific character of health as an essential component for individual and collec-
tive well-being. The normative embedding of health argues for an economic analysis 
recognizing the ubiquity of values in this area. These values, defined as reasons for act-
ing, are institutionalized in ethical and social codes, deontological instruments, moral 
standards, or rationales of gift-making from which economic policies cannot free 
themselves. 
There are multiple values acting as a conception of the “good” and serving to justify or 
criticize behavior or policy. Values can be used to characterize situations in terms of 
norms. A narrow view of values would see them as the product of self-interest. There 
would then be as many conceptions of the “good” as there are individuals and individ-
ual rationality (homo œconomicus) would be enough to take account of the existence 
of values.  
Contrariwise, in the theoretical apparatus of the French heterodox school of econom-
ics of convention, there are a small number of shared references, detached from indi-
vidual interests, that may be termed “conventions” and these conventions are collec-
tive representations of institutions like the social security system or the hospital 
system. By giving meaning to these institutions, conventions breathe life into them. 
They paint a fair or true picture of an institution (fair meaning both passable and im-
partial, true meaning both genuine and accurate). 
Since conventions are in competition, they do not block out conflict. But only one con-
vention may prevail at a given time. Conventions can be categorized by their level of 
generality. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) came up with a limited number of general 
conventions, claiming them to be universally valid because they are directed towards 
a form of common good. A “market” convention gives precedence to individual self-
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interest and competition; a “civic” convention affirms the role of the general interest 
as a criterion for justification and criticism; an industrial convention values efficiency 
and performance; a “domestic” convention derives its legitimacy from its capacity to 
uphold tradition, proximity, etc. This interpretation can be used to characterize the 
quality of goods or work (Eymard-Duvernay, 1989) and take seriously people’s capacity 
to judge or criticize.  
2. The Inspired/Domestic Convention of Healthcare 
Quality 
This section proposes to define the inspired/domestic convention of 
healthcare quality. This involves examining the historical construction of the 
medical profession. In France, the profession has been constructed between 
market and state (2.1). Eluding both market competition and bureaucratic 
rules, doctors have built their trust-based relationship with patients around 
the adherence to values specific to the medical world – medical ethics (2.2). 
2.1 The Medical Profession: Between Market and State 
The history of medicine has been characterized since the French Revolution 
as an attempt to build a monopoly of medical activity. The liberal dimension 
of the Revolution can be seen in medicine by the removal of protection for 
the profession by the Allarde decrees of March 1791 (abolition of corpora-
tions). Doctors then came into competition with those they called charlatans, 
bringing down prices and making the medical business insecure. The years 
of struggle bore fruit in 1892 with the Chevandier Act restoring the doctors’ 
monopoly over medicine and prohibiting “health officers” (position intro-
duced in 1803)4 and other claimants (bone-setters, healers, and so on). 
While doctors rejected competitive medicine, they also rejected adminis-
tered medicine. At the same time as the Chevandier Act removed the danger 
of competition, social conflict situations brought the spectra of the socializa-
tion of healthcare production stage-front. The 1893 legislation on free medi-
cal assistance posed the central problem for doctors over the ensuing period: 
Should third-party involvement (public or non-public financing) be accepted 
for financing medical procedures and therefore determining prices and ar-
rangements for payment?  
The profession was far from united over the question especially because of 
the insecurity experienced by many doctors whose patients were insolvent. 
 
4  “Health officers” were people who practiced medicine without the title of doctor but who had 
proved their experience to a panel. They worked primarily with the rural poor. Before 1892, this 
was actually a minor victory for doctors who secured minimal regulation of their profession.  
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Nonetheless, in 1927 doctors adopted the Charter of Liberal Medicine which 
is the profession’s common ground even today (Hassenteufel 1997). Among 
other principles, the Charter provides that healthcare should be financed by 
direct agreement between patient and doctor (without the financer’s involve-
ment) through the interplay of a negotiation in which the doctor takes ac-
count of the patient’s specific situation and is ready, when required, to per-
form procedures inexpensively or free-of-charge.  
This direct understanding cannot be thought of solely as a financial mech-
anism; it is also a principle intended to ensure the quality of healthcare. The 
non-involvement of third parties (like the rejection of competition) is justified 
for the sake of healthcare quality. When a third party is involved in financing 
(especially the state), there is a danger it will seek to intervene in the organi-
zation of healthcare and administer work to the patient’s detriment. Accord-
ingly, alongside the principle of direct agreement, the Charter of Liberal Med-
icine promotes therapeutic freedom and freedom to prescribe. Doctors, 
guided by their conscience, are in the best position to decide what the proper 
procedure for each patient is. 
This history explains the importance of medical ethics for the profession. 
Medicine is organized around codes of deontology, professional councils, 
and Hippocratic values that codify practice and legitimate professional au-
tonomy with respect to bureaucratic and market rules. In order to analyze 
medical practices in the language of the economics of convention, it is helpful 
to make a detour by way of the sociology of professions. For Florent Champy 
(2009, 2015), what makes professions specific is the type of problems they 
have to solve, which relates to the singularity and the complexity of cases.  
The professional was confronted, then, with a twofold uncertainty. On the 
one side, there was great uncertainty about the singularity of the case under 
study and, on the other side, the uncertainty surrounded the tension among 
the different principles allowed for when deciding on the end-purposes of the 
action. This choice among several possible conceptions of the good, among 
several conventions, underpins the ethical dimension of professions. Delib-
eration over the end-purposes of the action implies ethical dilemmas that are 
what constitute the professional’s work. 
We shall refer to this work quality convention as the inspired/domestic con-
vention. 
For Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), the conflict of worlds and criticism does 
not necessarily impose the victory of one convention over another, of a con-
ception of justice over another. Criticism can be overwhelmed by compro-
mise. It is a situation of suspension of the dispute, without eliminating it, with 
the aim of moving towards a common good. The authors give the example of 
a loan from a local bank to a client with whom the owner maintains personal 
ties. Two principles of justice are in competition to decide on the granting or 
not of the loan: the market convention (profit perspectives) and the domestic 
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convention (personal relationships). In this situation, a compromise between 
market and domestic worlds emerges when the participants give up clarify-
ing the principle of their agreement, focusing only on an intention oriented 
towards the common good. In the case of liberal medicine, two conventions 
form the basis of the compromise: the inspired convention and the domestic 
convention. 
An essential condition for professionals to be able to manage uncertainty 
suitably is that they have substantial autonomy in their work. This autonomy 
does not relate to the end-purposes of the activity (the doctor cannot do just 
anything) nor to the means used in the activity (autonomy of means is not 
specific to the learned professions). Professional autonomy relates to two 
things: (1) The margin of interpretation of the cases studied. Since the activity 
is characterized by the singularity of cases and complexity, doctors have con-
siderable leeway for interpretation. (2) The capacity to deliberate on the hier-
archy of end-purposes and on their precise content in the context of the gen-
eral end-purposes of the activity. Given the general requirements of medical 
activity, doctors may, within this framework, define and rank the end-pur-
poses of the activity: do no harm rather than cure, relieve pain rather than do 
nothing, and so on.  
In this sense, medical practice takes on the attributes specific to the in-
spired city. Deliberation may be viewed as a way to find inspiration in order 
to respond to the singularity and complexity of cases. As the divide between 
the universal principle and singular practice cannot be closed, the profes-
sional must act with prudence – in the sense of practical wisdom – in deliber-
ating on what ought to be done. In the inspired city, “people are creative when 
separated from others, withdrawn as it were into their inner selves” (Boltan-
ski and Chiapello 2007). 
The inspired character of the health professional’s quality convention can-
not fully grasp the complexity of the “art of medicine.” The deliberative space 
that opens up for the doctor implies that the illness should not be dissociated 
from the patient. Doctors’ detachment is therefore primarily metaphysical; 
their practice, however, is firmly attached to the patient, to the individual in 
all their singularity and with whom the career must be able to forge a rela-
tionship of trust and closeness. Such practice then resonates with the “per-
sonification of resources” that is specific to the domestic city. The domestic 
characterization of beings rests on approximations of time relations and ap-
peal to the ancestral, either through topological correspondences referring to 
what is near, or through hierarchical comparisons resorting to authority 
(Thévenot 1990). This brings us back to the characteristics of health profes-
sionals founding their practice on their traditional knowledge of medicine 
and of their patients to whom they are close enough to enter the sphere of 
intimacy by becoming “the family doctor.” The familiarity of this relationship 
underpins the trust on which doctors can base their authority.  
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Because it takes on the attributes of both the inspired city and the domestic 
city, it is proposed to characterize this healthcare quality convention as in-
spired/domestic, following the logic of the “compromise” that may be found 
between two orders of magnitude. Regarding the inspired/domestic compro-
mise, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) particularly insist on the relation of mas-
ter to disciple. Theoretical knowledge of the texts is insufficient for learning 
because only experience, transmitted by the personal and bodily authority of 
the master, allows the apprentice to understand all the complexity of the pro-
fession. In the case of the medical relationship, the compromise between in-
spired and domestic convention expresses the overcoming of the conflict be-
tween the inspiration necessary to find a medical solution in an uncertain 
universe and the proximity between patient and doctor necessary to obtain 
the confidence of the patient who puts in play his own body. The inspired / 
domestic convention is thus the closest thing to what doctors call medical art. 
Although these two types of justification may seem to abandon any dimen-
sion of quality control, this is not actually the case. The autonomy bestowed 
on doctors in their practice is only acceptable to the extent that it is offset by 
institutions that make it acceptable. 
2.2  Medical Ethics as a Solution to the Problem of Trust 
The existence of a medical council, of codes of deontology, of the Hippocratic 
Oath, of long years of study, and so forth are what cements trust between doc-
tors and patients. Medical ethics is the counter-gift necessary for professional 
autonomy in the inspired/domestic convention (Batifoulier 1992). From this 
perspective, since only a doctor is in a position to judge another doctor, qual-
ity is controlled by professional institutions and not by the state or the mar-
ket.  
Conventionalist work has demonstrated that medical ethics can be under-
stood as a convention ensuring coordination of the healthcare system (Bati-
foulier 2009). Deontological rules are incomplete and evasive by nature. They 
alone cannot prescribe what behavior to adopt. Ethical codes are pointless 
unless interpreted by doctors. Endowing doctors with interpretative rational-
ity within the frame of the economics of convention fills the gap between the 
rule and its contents. Situations are then interpreted on the basis of the rep-
resentations doctors have of the collective interest – of what ought to be done.  
Medical ethics can thus be understood as the plural set of normative re-
sources specific to the medical profession. In this light, it is possible to isolate 
three “characteristic values” marking the outlines of medical ethics without 
providing an inflexible definition of it (Batifoulier 2011). Doctors’ normativity 
is made up of a range of values by which the rules can be interpreted. These 
values are drawn on differently in the different professional areas and the 
places where medical activity is conducted. Doctors in public-sector hospitals 
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are probably more sensitive to the quality of the public service than doctors 
in full liberal practice or in private for-profit establishments. Doctors, like 
other guilds or corporations, do not form a uniform whole. But, at some level 
of identity, the level of the profession, a form of unity (which does not mean 
identical representations) may come about around distinctive values, which 
each doctor might recognize, even if the onus placed on each of these values 
may vary from one doctor to the next. From this perspective, three types of 
characteristic values can be identified supporting doctors’ capacity from 
making ethical judgements: Hippocratic values, healthcare values, and lib-
eral values (Batifoulier 2009).  
(1) Hippocratic values: These values express doctors’ concern – as members 
of a professional group – for patients. Hippocratism is the corner stone of 
medical paternalism and care as exercised by doctors. These values arise 
from the four founding principles of medicine listed by Gillon (1994): respect 
for the patient’s autonomy, non-malevolence, benevolence, and fairness. 
These values are intended to organize the socialization of members of the 
profession (Gadreau 2009). The profession must be aligned with the interest 
of the individual patient. Hippocratic values derive from the institutions of 
trust that assure society that doctors’ give of their time and their person.  
(2) Healthcare values: Doctors bear responsibility for the valuable good of 
health. This time, beyond the individual case, healthcare is a value in itself 
that should be protected by social organization. Several theoretical traditions 
form part of this approach: health is a primary natural good (Rawls 1971), a 
specific mode of the good life (Ricoeur 2004), or a need (Batifoulier and Da 
Silva 2014). These different approaches justify the doctor having the role of 
promoting health as a generality just as attorneys, as a profession, defend the 
idea of justice (Bessis 2008). Doctors are therefore not just responsible for im-
proving individual well-being but are also the trustees of the idea of health.  
(3) Liberal values: According to these values, the only way to defend the 
Hippocratic mission and the health objective is the liberal organization. 
These values are more recent and correspond, in France, to the construction 
of liberal medicine as against the social state. As seen, the 1927 Charter of 
Liberal Medicine can be considered the kernel of the liberal project of medi-
cine in France. The principle of direct agreement, direct payment, and free-
dom of where to set up in practice are thought of as the conditions that guar-
antee quality healthcare and rigorous ethics. This liberalism is not economic 
liberalism. Competition is prohibited and the question of income is made a 
relative matter by and large. Besides, medical liberalism is built around doc-
tors’ duty to be generous. Waived fees and variable prices are the symbol of 
liberal charity by which the only judge of the “gift of care” should be the indi-
vidual doctor and not the administration. But socialization deprives doctors 
of the ability to do justice.  
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All told, medical ethics is fed by multiple representatives of what ought to 
be done. These normative principles are not fully defined turn-key solutions: 
they are liable to change with time and place. Public policy is one of the most 
important sources for explaining the development of medical ethics. Many 
works have already shown how, through predominantly market reforms, 
medical ethics has gradually shifted towards legitimating market behaviors 
in the medical relationship (box 2). 
Box 2: The Market Coloring of Medical Ethics 
Public policy is not without its effect on behaviors and representations ensuring coor-
dination in the health system. Since 1980 at least, the market orientation of public 
health policy has modified the medical profession’s conception of what ought to be 
done (Batifoulier et al. 2007): opening of the fixed-charge sector to fee surcharges, mul-
tiplication of financial incentives aimed at doctors, growing direct contribution from 
patient to healthcare financing, etc. All of these developments contribute to modifying 
the conception of healthcare. Healthcare is tending to become a commodity in a mar-
ket like any other.  
The market principles disseminated by public policy do not fall upon value-free 
ground. They must fit in with traditional medical values. Modification of the rules does 
not change doctors into out-and-out retail dealers. Values remain multiple, which is 
why the conventionalist literature on healthcare speaks of “market coloring” of medi-
cal ethics (Batifoulier and Biencourt 2005; Batifoulier and Gadreau 2006). But within 
that plurality, public policy has made the market framework salient.  
In terms of rules and instruments of governance, certain works have shown that law 
is being colonized by economic terminology. Abecassis and Domin (2008) have thus 
analyzed the development of terms used in drafting national medical contracts and 
have identified an increasing occurrence of financial concerns. In the French 
healthcare system, relations between the medical unions and the social security sys-
tem are legally organized by collective contracts called “medical conventions.” Medi-
cal conventions are not related to the economics of convention, but one can analyze 
medical conventions from the theoretical framework of economics of convention. The 
2005 convention introducing the position of gatekeeper (“médecin traitant”) is the one 
that provides the most propitious ground for economic and accounting notions. The 
medicalized control of spending at the core of the analysis also pushes aside any ideas 
of sanctions or constraints for doctors. More generally, this economics-based format-
ting of law puts financial incentives at the nexus of the analysis as the prime instru-
ments of regulation (Allouache and Vacarie 2008). 
The market orientation of public policy means that expensive procedures are run-of-
the-mill. Surcharges become higher and more common (Aballea et al. 2008). The mar-
ket coloring of medical ethics can be identified by the movement towards ending 
charge-free care (Batifoulier et al. 2009). The literature has highlighted the whittling 
away of the “free-of-charge share” of care in liberal medicine (Batifoulier and Ventelou 
2003). 
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3. The Industrial Convention of Healthcare Quality 
This analyzes how the industrial convention of healthcare quality trans-
formed since the 1970s in counterpoint to the inspired/domestic convention 
that has come under a great deal of criticism over this period (3.1). On the 
basis of that criticism, I emphasize the state’s role in building up institutions 
for the industrialization of healthcare (3.2). 
3.1 Criticism of the Inspired/Domestic Convention 
From the late 1970s onwards, with the surge in post-Fordist capitalism and 
the progressive questioning of the socialization of health spending, a radical 
shift came about in the formalization of problems of regulating liberal medi-
cine: instead of regulating prices, the authorities were to look more closely at 
the question of healthcare quality (Da Silva and Gadreau 2015). The main an-
gle of attack for this new question concerns the generic phenomenon of var-
iability of practice (Kerleau 1998). The fact that, in the same situation, thera-
peutic treatments and prescriptions may be different is necessarily viewed as 
a “problem” of healthcare quality. Variability in practice reflects the occur-
rence of potentially dangerous and/or pointless procedures, which is an un-
conscionable waste of resources in times of economic crisis. This empirical 
problem can be interpreted in terms of two theories that format the reformist 
discourse in healthcare.  
On the one hand, a whole branch of the public health literature points to 
the problems of information processing (Sackett et al. 1996). With the expo-
nential advancement of medical research throughout the 20th century, data 
have accumulated with no synthesis of good and bad practice. There is a wait 
of several years before primary-care doctors can apply the latest research 
findings. This means that for want of training and clear dissemination of in-
formation, many practices persist that are barely pertinent and even danger-
ous. Therefore, the variability of practices related to difficulties in processing 
information directly poses a problem to healthcare quality.  
On the other hand, standard economic literature adopts an interpretation 
in terms of information rent (McGuire 2000; Rochaix 1997). In contradistinc-
tion to the foregoing theories underscoring the frailty of medical knowledge 
in an increasingly complex world, this literature focuses on the informational 
advantages doctors have over patients and insurers. The abundant use of the 
idea of “agency relationship” fully attests to this theoretical position. As an 
agent, the doctor supposedly has more information in the exchange than the 
principal: he has discretionary power. Now, because the doctor is a homo œco-
nomicus looking to maximize utility, he or she will exploit this surplus infor-
mation so as to extract an undue rent. The performance of the task for the 
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principal therefore departs from the optimal market situation and is as vari-
able as the extent of the doctor’s informational advantage may be.  
These two sources of variability in practice (information processing and in-
formation rents) were to lead to medical power being challenged as in the 
1970s. For one thing, the lasting occurrence of long-term illnesses, such as 
HIV, were to call medical paternalism into question (Barbot and Dodier 2000). 
Sufferers, being the leading specialists of their illness in many respects, be-
came organized to contribute to the therapeutic process against the tradition 
of medical paternalism. For another thing, health crises, such as the contam-
inated blood scandal, did much to sap trust in the medical profession (Benam-
ouzig 2005). Questions of transparency of information came to the forefront 
with control over the exercise of medical power as their main objective.  
Despite historically strong symbolic power, the wariness of contemporary 
times is reflected by the attempt to control medical power – no longer with 
respect to prices, but to quality. Whether the justification was the sheer vol-
ume of information or alternatively doctors’ information rents, the variability 
in practice became an intolerable problem of healthcare quality in the last 
third of the 20th century. Improvement in healthcare quality and the restor-
ing of the bond of trust between medicine and the health system conse-
quently necessitated resolving the informational problems specific to liberal 
medicine – that is they necessitated that practices be made uniform.  
However, because of past history, direct intervention by the authorities in 
the medical relationship is reputed to be an intrusion that threatens 
healthcare quality. How did the institution traditionally associated with a 
threat to the quality of care – the state – manage to become its staunchest de-
fender? This turnaround, which rested on the quantification of healthcare 
quality, came about in two stages. 
The first condition for the regulator to earn legitimacy to control the quality 
of care is the transformation in the definition of that quality within the field 
of medicine itself. Traditionally, the medical field was barely codified and for-
malized although the register for legitimization was that of “science.” In the 
post-war years, a new method revolutionizing the production of medical evi-
dence came to light in the United Kingdom: the randomized clinical trial (box 
3). Further to the first randomized clinical trials, medicine was gradually to 
make systematic use of statistics in its research – with this method becoming 
the hub of evidence-based medicine. Evidence-based medicine rests upon the 
principle of a rank order of evidence, with the random clinical trial being the 
leading level of evidence ahead of traditional laboratory experiments. The 
idea is to contest and/or supplement knowledge from individual practice with 
statistically grounded outside data so as to reduce variability in practices by 
choosing the most effective treatments by which “good practices” can be de-
fined. 
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Box 3: The Emergence of the Gold Standard of Randomized Clinical Trials. 
(Keel 2011) 
In the post-war USA and UK, research into tuberculosis was the subject of innovative 
methodology with multi-center trials. These were trials in a large number of different 
healthcare centers so as to statistically mix a large number of patients and doctors. The 
idea was to remove any local contingency from the observed effect of the treatment. 
The multi-center trial criterion was therefore the first of the two criteria for defining the 
randomized clinical trial, the second being randomization. Randomization is a statisti-
cal procedure for apportioning patients selected to take part in the trial between an 
experimental group and a control group by chance alone. 
It was more specifically in the UK, against the backdrop of a medicinal drugs shortage 
and some doctors being unconvinced of the effect of streptomycin on tuberculosis, 
that the gold standard of the randomized clinical trial was defined. The clinical experi-
mentation of 1947/1948 by the Medical Research Council involved the two criteria of a 
randomized clinical trial: multi-center tests and randomization. The treatment was 
proved to be largely effective with a death rate of 7% for patients receiving treatment 
versus 27% for those not receiving treatment. 
The surge in randomized clinical trials in the medical field answered the 
problem of synthesizing information by the use of statistics. But there were 
not any institutions then to compel doctors to apply quantified standards (this 
is the problem of informational rent). The second stage in the quantification 
of healthcare quality was the appropriation by the authorities of the standards 
of the medical field in order to regulate professional practices. While initially 
having no legitimacy for debating healthcare quality, the regulator can defuse 
this criticism since it is now the one that is seeking to improve the quality of 
care by way of quantified standards produced by evidence-based medicine. 
This second stage, which fits in with the expansion of new public manage-
ment in healthcare, is that of the construction of institutions for industrializ-
ing care.  
3.2 The Strategies of Healthcare Industrialization 
What I shall refer to as the industrial convention is the convention of 
healthcare quality that arose in the 1970s in criticism of the inspired/domestic 
convention. The industrial convention is thus characterized by the concep-
tion it has of illness as a quantitative variation of the normal state (not ill) 
which may be defined from the intensive use of statistics (in the lineage of 
evidence-based medicine). The legitimate organization of the medical profes-
sion ensues from this starting point. Since the disease can be isolated from 
the sufferer by quantifying it, it is the disease and not the sufferer that should 
be treated. The major medical problem therefore is not adaptation to the 
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singularity of the case or the resolution of a complex problem. It lies in re-
ducing variability in practices by resorting to quantified standards.  
In this context, “independent” agencies are called on to produce incontro-
vertible scientific syntheses. In France, this falls to the High Authority of 
Health (Haute Autorité de Santé). It is the job of The National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence in the United Kingdom, Belgian Health Care 
Knowledge Centre in Belgium, and Institute for Quality and Efficiency in 
Health Care in Germany. Evidence-based medicine provides medical data 
that are supposedly neutral and objective and which serve as the basis for 
drafting “good practices.” Doctors must then use these standards to treat the 
“average patient.” Once the diagnosis has been made, their main job is to as-
sign the specific case to one of the general categories of the nomenclature 
and deliver the corresponding treatment.  
Now, “submission to quality standards is a basic element of industrial logic” 
(Eymard-Duvernay 1989, 346). This convention is industrial because it con-
ceives of the healthcare service as a product and because its primary objective 
is to gain in productivity and efficiency. The “rationalization” of which it is 
often questioned relates to the reduction of complexity through standardiza-
tion. It is a necessary step for controlling medical work and making scale 
economies. This convention is also related to a massive use of statistics. 
Quantified indicators have pride of place in the new healthcare quality con-
vention: the quantified standard is the bedrock for quality control and quality 
incentives.  
Numerous tools have come to light to provide a fulcrum for the industrial 
convention. In the case of liberal medicine, the authorities created new dis-
positives from scratch to challenge the inspired/domestic convention. Sev-
eral tiers of construction of the industrial convention can be made out, that 
might be called the strategies of healthcare industrialization:  
- Creation of norms: standardized norms are created in the medical field 
itself with the support of evidence-based medicine. These norms have 
little power in themselves, which is why the authorities have their work 
cut out when attempting to introduce them into medical practices. 
- Certification and circulation of norms: the creation of independent 
agencies is an essential step since they are thought to be a-political and 
entirely technical (Benamouzig and Besançon 2005). This means their 
quality can be certified (depending on the results of medical research) 
and they can be circulated among professionals. In this way, in 2004, 
the Haute autorité de santé superseded the Agence nationale d’accrédi-
tation et d’évaluation en santé, which itself, in 1997, had taken the place 
of the Agence nationale de développement de l’évaluation médicale 
(founded in 1989).5 
 
5  Respectively, “High Authority of Health,” “National Accreditation and Assessment Agency,” and 
“National agency for the Development of Medical Assessment.” 
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- Supervision of practices: the supervision of actual practices, to deter-
mine the deviation from the norm, requires the black box of the pa-
tient/doctor relationship to be opened up. The development of infor-
mation systems throughout the 1990s filled this gap, with for example, 
the Système national d’information inter-régime de l’Assurance mala-
die6 and the creation of the carte Vitale. 
- Modification of practices: knowledge of the norms and of deviations 
from the norm is not enough to modify practices. For this, a first stage, 
begun in the late 2000s, was to provide financial incentives to doctors to 
adopt standardized practices. This was the case with the Contrat d’amé-
lioration des pratiques individuelles of 2009 and, since 2011, the Rému-
nération sur objectifs de santé publique.7 Doctors can claim bonuses 
for attaining objectives relating to quantified healthcare, for efficiency 
in prescribing, and for the organization of their medical practice (see 
below).  
- Sanctions for wayward practices: alongside the incentive model, but 
less distinctly, one can see the development of a threat of sanctions for 
failure to abide by the norms. The soft law made up by publications re-
lating to the standardization of care is being drawn on increasingly in 
law suits brought by patients (Mascret 2008). 
Among the strategies of healthcare industrialization, performance-based re-
muneration is a central tool for modifying the healthcare quality convention. 
For public health insurance, performance-based insurance is a tool for im-
proving individual practices that can cut spending and provide an incentive 
to achieve quality (Polton 2010). Performance-based remuneration estab-
lishes a correlation between attaining quantified performance objectives and 
doctors’ pay. The 2011 medical convention8 institutionalized the Remunera-
tion on Public Health Objective (Rémunération sur Objectif de Santé Publique; 
ROSP) as a supplement to traditional pay arrangements: ROSP has become 
the third pillar of remuneration of liberal medicine – alongside payment by 
procedure and lump-sum payments. Initially (in 2001), this mechanism con-
cerned only general practitioners for adult patients. It now involves special-
ists (cardiologists, gastroenterologists, endocrinologists) and doctors caring 
for children. In 2018, ROSP represented €259.4 million in spending for gate-
keeper doctors for adults divided among 55,102 professionals. Average remu-
neration for general practitioners treating adults was €4,705 versus €153 for 
indicators concerning children, €2,146 for cardiologists, and €1,406 for gas-
troenterologists. ROSP is also concerned with health centers (non-liberal 
group medicine), which received on average €7,646 (for 433 centers). While 
 
6  “National Inter-Regime Health Insurance Information System.” 
7  Respectively, “Individual Practice Improvement Contract” and “Remuneration on Public Health 
Objective.” 
8  See Box 2 for the distinction between medical conventions and economy of convention. 
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such payment represented just 3 to 8% of doctors’ income, there is no denying 
the dynamics of the extension of performance-related pay in France. 
4. Industrialization as the Overturning of the Medical 
Relationship 
This section provides a critical review of the industrial healthcare quality con-
vention. Although the convention is based on legitimate arguments, the state, 
by presenting it as a rationalization, is denying how complex medical reality 
is (to the detriment of patients and doctors alike [4.1]). Industrialization 
brings about a rearrangement of medical values that is not without conse-
quences for the patient-doctor relationship and the health system (4.2). 
4.1  Industrialization is not Rationalization 
The reforms leading to the adoption of the industrial healthcare quality con-
vention are often presented in the public debate as a necessary “rationaliza-
tion” of medical work. The practices arising from the inspired/domestic con-
vention are supposedly devoid of legitimacy and the industrialization of 
healthcare is seen as an incontrovertible process for improving quality – qual-
ity in the singular. However, the industrial convention also suffers from ma-
jor criticisms both in terms of the epistemology of illness and the epistemol-
ogy of the statistics it deals in.  
In terms of the epistemology of illness, in the wake of work by Georges 
Canguilhem (1966; Durive 2014), recent research tends to show that, although 
evidence-based medicine enables numerous advances, it does not exhaust 
the whole of medical reality. In his renowned book, The Normal and the Patho-
logical, Canguilhem argues outright against the positivist definition of illness 
that took it to be a mere quantitative variation of the normal state.9 He claims 
that normal and pathological states are two different things. Illness should be 
viewed as “another way of life” or a clean break with the state of well-being. 
Here, the break is not the outcome of a measurable quantitative variation be-
tween two states since that would mean there is a continuum between normal 
and pathological. Illness is the expression of the invalid’s subjectivity, making 
it a value judgement and not just an indisputable fact as in the positivist con-
ception. It is no longer the scientist who is the source of knowledge but the 
invalid: it is because the sick person feels there is a sharp break with the nor-
mal state that there is illness. The bounds of the “normal” being the subject 
of debate in the positivist conception take on a whole new meaning: the 
 
9  For the relation between the economics of convention and Canguilhem’s conception of health, 
see also Diaz-Bone (2021; in this Special Issue). 
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characterization “normal” no longer refers so much to a statistical norm as to 
a social norm. Illness becomes a value judgement each invalid makes when 
suffering. In many cases, the healthcare relationship counts just as much as 
the healthcare procedure. The emblematic case illustrating this idea is the 
placebo effect: symbols can cure. In this context, alongside evidence-based 
medicine, there are calls to defend patient-centered medicine that take ac-
count of emotions, experience, and the individuality of patients more gener-
ally (Bensing 2000). 
In terms of the epistemology of statistics, other works show that one should 
be cautious about generalizing evidence-based medicine. In a recent article, 
Rainer Diaz-Bone (2016) recalled that one of the origins of the economy of 
convention was precisely the study of statistical conventions. He shows that 
a large part of Alain Desrosières’ work has consisted in demonstrating the 
conventional dimension of statistical tools. Measuring unemployment rates 
or illness requires prior agreement on the definition of the thing to be meas-
ured. To quantify is to agree and then to measure. However, all statistical 
work is marked by the cultural and material conditions in which it is regis-
tered. 
In the case of evidence based medicine, the material conditions in which 
statistical proof is produced may adversely affect its relevance. This is notably 
the case with research into medicinal drugs then recommended by the vari-
ous health authorities and prescribed by doctors. As studies are expensive, 
laboratories tend to exert pressure to shorten the statutory duration of re-
search or take intermediate indicators (biomarkers) as quality indicators in-
stead of final indicators (lower rates of illness or death). This now leads to 
increased adverse events after the testing phase when the drugs are already 
on the market. The material production conditions also affect the research 
orientation of the financing laboratories (Keel 2011): are they better off fi-
nancing research to improve dietary practices or coming up with appetite 
suppressing drugs? 
In non-hospital practice, the introduction of ROSP in 2011 illustrates the dif-
ficulties with the industrialization of healthcare. ROSP is a pay incentive 
scheme based on attainment of quantified healthcare quality objectives. This 
mechanism has been developed in France despite great skepticism of inter-
national studies about experiments of the kind. Research in this area fails to 
demonstrate it is worth complying with standardized norms to cut health 
spending or improve healthcare quality. With several years’ hindsight, stud-
ies of the French case show the mechanism is ineffective (e.g., Sicsic and 
Franc 2017). Moreover, it seems many quality indicators are open to criti-
cism. The medical journal Prescrire10 (Prescribe) reports that of the 26 
 
10  See issues 352, 353, 355, 356, and 357 of volume 33 published in 2013. 
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indicators included in ROSP in 2011, only nine are relevant given the current 
state of medical knowledge.  
The industrial convention is not baseless if one thinks back to the criticisms 
of the inspired/domestic convention. But, as against the idea of rationaliza-
tion, it seems that, given the current state of knowledge, the inspired/domes-
tic convention maintains considerable legitimacy because of its conception 
of healthcare as individual. These two conventions provide two organizations 
of the ideal-type healthcare system with their own institutions. Table 1 sum-
marizes them. 
Table 1 Inspired/Domestic and Industrial Healthcare Quality Conventions 
 
Inspired / Domestic  
Convention 
Industrial Convention 
Definition of illness 
Qualitative break with nor-
mal state 
Quantitative variation from 
normal state 
Subject of activity Patient-invalid pairing Illness 
Medical problem to  
be solved 
Singularity and complexity Heterogeneous practices 
Subject of healthcare Individual patient Average patient 
Specificity of medical 
knowledge 
Based on experience Based on standards 
Doctor’s task To adapt to the case To attribute the case 
Definition of quality Professional Evidence-based medicine 
Medical ethics Paramount Secondary 
Institution of trust Medical ethics Certification agency 
 
For both conventions, the starting point is the position with respect to the 
“right” definition of illness. The polysemy of the French word “juste” allows 
one to highlight the normative tensions on the conception of the disease. This 
word refers to correctness (“justesse”), that is to say to the true and to the false 
but, it also refers to justice (“justice”), that is to say to the good and the bad. 
There is therefore a double tension on the “right” conception of the disease: 
is it “right” because it succeeds in treating? Is it “right” because it corresponds 
to a just vision of the doctor-patient relationship? If there is no consensus as 
to fact, the orientation in the direction of one or another of the definitions 
determines the organization of the healthcare system.  
Applying the inspired/domestic as logic, illness is a qualitative break with 
the normal state. This break is identified by the invalid. In this sense the in-
valid comes first and the subject of the healthcare activity is the patient-inva-
lid pairing. The medical problem to be solved from the regulator’s standpoint 
is the healthcare system’s capacity to adapt to the singularity and complexity 
of each case to care for the individual patient. Medical knowledge must then 
be based on the experience of the professional who learns to adapt to each 
case and acts autonomously. Healthcare quality is defined by the doctor in 
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person: doctors ensure the quality of care they deliver. The potential for op-
portunism in such a setting is offset by the primacy of medical ethics. Pa-
tients’ trust in their doctor and in the healthcare system as a whole makes 
medical ethics central to the organization of healthcare. 
Conversely, under the industrial convention, illness is a quantitative and 
therefore measurable departure from the normal state. This means that doc-
tors are able to say whether or not there is illness independently of the patient 
merely by observing a measurable deviation from the norm. The medical 
problem to be solved is to reduce the heterogeneity of practices with respect 
to a predefined standard. The professional’s autonomy is the enemy. The 
good professional is now the professional who knows and applies standards 
defined elsewhere. The doctor must be in a position to identify cases and at-
tribute them to pre-established nomenclatures of procedures and prescrip-
tions. Quality is produced no longer in the practitioner’s surgery, but in the 
results of evidence-based medicine. Medical ethics is therefore no longer as 
decisive as under the inspired/domestic convention since trust lies in the 
work of the certification agencies. The industrial convention effects a division 
of labor with, on the one side, a medical and administrative body tasked with 
defining quality practices and, on the other side, primary-care doctors tasked 
with strictly applying top-down norms.  
The healthcare industrialization movement rests in part on a legitimate 
foundation: the multiplication of medical knowledge that is difficult for doc-
tors to master and the crises of liberal medicine justify reflection on profes-
sional practices. Nonetheless, the state has seized on the tools of evidence-
based medicine, toughening debate within medical circles. The industrializa-
tion of healthcare raises problems of two kinds relating to the epistemology 
of illness and the epistemology of statistics. Public policy is contributing to a 
rearrangement of characteristic values, which is not a neutral process.  
4.2  The Rearrangement of Medical Values 
By substituting the industrial healthcare quality convention for the in-
spired/domestic convention, the regulator’s new strategy contributes to the 
renewal of medical ethics.  
4.2.1  Hippocratic Values: The Dangerous Milk of Human Kindness 
The most radical transformation the industrial convention brings to medical 
ethics bears on Hippocratic values. The automatic character of decision-mak-
ing subsequent to application of standards drains the lifeblood from the per-
sonal relationship between doctor and patient. Under the new healthcare 
quality convention, Hippocratism is no longer paramount. The patient need 
not expect a moral quality of the doctor in the individual intercourse because 
application of the norm is enough to secure quality care. The change of 
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convention calls for a renewal of medical ethics. Doctors are no longer ex-
pected to have some moral competence about them: evaluating good and evil. 
Competence must be primarily technical (Jaunait 2005). 
Hippocratism may even be harmful. Doctors who decide not to comply with 
the standard treatment out of concern for the patient may be considered a 
“danger for public health.” In wanting to be benevolent, doctors depart from 
the norm, which on aggregate means lower quality and higher costs of care.  
Benevolence does not disappear, though, under the industrial convention. 
Instead of residing in the doctor, it resides in the protocol. Trust resides no 
longer in the doctor personally but in the “im-personal” character of the in-
dependent agency. Protocol-based medicine challenges medical paternalism 
and overshadows the doctor’s autonomy. The patient’s trust should no longer 
lie in the professional alone but should be driven towards the quantified 
norm and the certification process. It is the paternalism of the expert that is 
valued. 
4.2.2  Healthcare Values: The Downgrading of Doctors 
The industrial convention of healthcare quality does not call the idea of health 
into question. In this, the infringement of characteristic values is less radical 
than in the case of Hippocratic values. Even so, two major changes in health 
as a value can be identified with a loss of status for the medical profession as 
their consequence.  
First, the new convention is an incentive to largely put the doctor figure in 
proportion as a trustee of healthcare. Doctors are no longer the guardians of 
this precious good of health. The definition and application of quantified 
standards is a source of de-singularization of care for patients and doctors 
alike. From the patient’s point of view, illness becomes something that can be 
detached or dis-embedded from the invalid. From the doctor’s point of view, 
experience and judgement are of no use insofar as the standard says what 
should be done in all circumstances. It is no longer a particular doctor who 
cares for a particular invalid but a standard that applies to an illness. Once 
the trustee of healthcare, the doctor is now just a cog in the division of labor. 
Under the industrial convention, the doctor is no longer the decision-making 
center; health is still a value per se but it is promoted primarily by independent 
agencies that produce norms on the strength of evidence-based medicine. Pa-
tients are invited to trust in the rules and procedures surrounding the stand-
ardization of healthcare – the independent agency and not the doctor being 
at the apex of the pyramid. Formerly charismatic and learned, doctors are the 
victims of a loss of status under the new convention.  
Second, the new convention highlights the conflict among several concep-
tions of healthcare. Whereas it might be thought that there is no conflict be-
tween healthcare at the individual (micro) level and health at the general 
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(macro) level, the emergence of the industrial convention contradicts this as-
sumption. In the same way as lawyers may have to advise their clients of a 
possible contradiction between the (general) idea of justice and their (indi-
vidual) claims (Bessis and Favereau 2010), doctors face the same type of prob-
lem when patients’ interests or wishes run counter to the idea of health. So, 
although the industrial convention is an injunction to care for the average pa-
tient so as to minimize the variability of practices and the effectiveness of 
treatments, under some circumstances (distribution queues), the interests of 
the individual patient need to be cared for differently from the average pa-
tient. Each case involves its own dilemma between the general and the par-
ticular.11 
The systematic application of protocols may produce situations in which 
doctors feel they are doing their job poorly because of conflict between the 
two levels of health. The view of the art is changing. Medical ethics is becom-
ing a bureaucratic or administrative ethics: it does not matter what the cases 
are; it takes detachment from the patients to be able to “tick the right boxes.” 
4.2.3  Liberal Values: From One Category of Liberty to the Next 
The industrial convention combats explicitly medical liberalism and forms 
an attack on the power of the profession which seeks to exclude the social 
state from organizing proper healthcare. Liberal-type medicine experiences 
the convention as an intolerable intrusion into the “doctor-patient relation-
ship.” However, while freedoms relating to medical practice are quite se-
verely called into question, freedom of price setting and where to set up are 
reinforced.  
As we have recalled on several occasions, the new quality convention relies 
on the possibility of dissolving healthcare quality in quantities. Although tra-
ditional values of the medical profession might quite easily come to terms 
with market liberalism developed by public policy, it seems that the indus-
trial healthcare quality convention, by challenging doctors’ autonomy more 
fundamentally, even threatens their status as professionals. The proliferation 
of production standards denies doctors their ability to practice with caution. 
They are no longer professionals but expendable cogs in the division of labor 
specific to the healthcare system. Political liberal identity crumbles to the 
benefit of bureaucratic rules. Doctors lose their therapeutic freedom and 
their freedom of prescription.  
 
11  Without recourse to the problems of evidence-based medicine, the question of immunization 
also illustrates the dilemma between the general and the particular. Individually, it may be that 
the vaccine is not in the patient’s best medical interests but it is in the general interest that as 
many patients as can be should be vaccinated for the treatment to be effective. Notice, though, 
that the continuum between the general and the particular interest seems to be far more re-
stricted for health than for justice. 
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It is from this perspective that ROSP prompts doctors to prescribe breast 
cancer screening to patients although the effectiveness of mammography is 
the subject of much controversy within the profession. Autonomy, once the 
corner stone of the profession’s organization, is now a threat. The industrial 
convention orchestrates the dispossession of freedoms of choice of therapy 
and prescription. This is its main value from the regulator’s point of view. But 
it is no longer for the doctor to say whether a mammography is required but 
instead for the norm produced by the independent agency. The bureaucratic 
rule alone is supposed to produce healthcare quality, and not the doctor’s au-
tonomous judgement.  
The regulator’s take-over of the therapeutic process gives rise to an original 
outcome that should be examined against the previous situation. Under the 
inspired/domestic convention, the gift of political freedom might be inter-
preted as the counter-gift for compliance with Hippocratic values. Quality 
care should derive from this social process. Accordingly, any questioning of 
medical liberalism was thought of as a threat to the quality of care – the so-
cialization or control of spending was then necessarily contrary to patients’ 
interests. The industrial convention reverses the logic of this criticism: doc-
tors’ criticism with respect to the state’s meddling in the “doctor-patient rela-
tionship” becomes more difficult inasmuch as these two institutions flatter 
themselves on the quality of care. It is easier to defend the quality of care 
against spending controls than against the quality of care itself (industrial 
convention). This development in the regulation of liberal medicine disarms 
the criticism from the profession with respect to the state.12 
However, it should not be imagined that the medical profession has been at 
a loss with respect to the second major turning point in liberal medicine. On 
the contrary, one should see in this a choice between freedoms that are not 
equivalent. By yielding ground on therapeutic freedom and freedom of pre-
scription, the medical profession has reinforced its freedoms with respect to 
charges and where to set up in practice.  
5. Conclusion 
The confrontation between the two healthcare quality conventions set out 
here raises a legitimate question of how to organize the healthcare system: 
How can we produce quality healthcare while at the same time ensuring that 
the singularity of the patient is taken into account together with the standard-
ization of practices consubstantial with a public healthcare perspective?  
 
12  At least initially because afterwards the criticism can and should bear on the possibility of dis-
solving quality in quantities. 
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The imposed industrialization of liberal medicine by public policy then 
poses a twofold problem. First, with the creation of powerful dispositives 
seeking to change behaviors (health agencies, good practice standards, infor-
mation systems, financial incentives, etc.), it hardens an opposition between 
two conceptions of illness and the healthcare activity which is far more nu-
anced in recent work in the medical field. Not only is there no consensus 
about the possibility of quantifying healthcare quality but, in addition, even 
the most ardent defenders of this position consider that statistical methods 
are not enough to evaluate the quality of a practice. Second, it is necessary to 
take the fact that the industrialization of liberal medicine is part of a general 
context of commodification of the world into account in the analysis, with the 
healthcare sector being one example (André et al. 2016).  
The commodification of the healthcare system is done by way of the surge 
in complementary insurance. The disengagement of the social security sys-
tem organized by the regulator is opening up a market for insurers who are 
becoming major actors in many domains. While the proportion of healthcare 
spending reimbursed by the social security system remains comparatively 
high on average (76.6%) and while it is very high in some sectors (91.1% for 
hospital treatment), it is quite low in others: 69.1% of medicinal drugs sold in 
non-hospital practice, 43.3% of medical devices such as spectacles or hearing 
aids, 32.5% of dental fees. For ambulatory care as a whole, only 64.1% 
(€102,063 billion) of spending is covered, the remainder being footed either 
by complementary insurance or by households (2014 figures in DRESS, 2015). 
From this viewpoint, it may be thought that industrialization is a potential 
accelerator of the commodification of healthcare in liberal medicine (Da Silva 
and Domin 2016). Commodification actually pre-exists industrialization by 
way of the disengagement of health insurance, but industrialization acceler-
ates the potential for commodification via the process of homogenization and 
comparison of healthcare services.  
For theoretical reasons, commodification presupposes the homogenization 
of the good (underpinning the industrial convention). Competitive logic can-
not be introduced for so long as doctors are reputed to produce individual 
medical procedures. For competition to be possible, services must be compa-
rable, which is made possible by generalizing quality standards. While it is 
hard to imagine price competition in liberal medicine, competition by com-
parison already operative in hospital care (with activity-based charging) 
seems far more plausible. In practice, there seems to be no obstacle to the 
ranking of liberal doctors in terms of their ROSP performance score. In the 
same way as we now are witnessing the growing development of hospital 
rankings (Pierru 2004), it would be perfectly possible to rank doctors in terms 
of their quality indicators.  
The most serious obstacle to the circulation of such information is the past 
history of conflict of liberal medicine with the social security system. But this 
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would be forgetting that commodification also involves complementary in-
surers. The social security system is disengaging (it finances 66.9% of liberal 
medicine spending), the 2013 national interprofessional agreement institu-
tionalizes complementary insurers for businesses and the reform of the third-
party payer system implies a major role for complementary insurance in ne-
gotiations with doctors. Complementary insurers will not remain blind fi-
nancers for long and healthcare quality may soon become an argument in 
negotiations with doctors. If one judges by what is happening with healthcare 
networks in other countries, complementary insurers are in a position to fos-
ter competition among doctors based on standardized quality criteria.  
In the United States, for example, in some health maintenance organiza-
tions doctors have a stake in the financial results of their network. As their 
remuneration depends on the difference between the lump-sum contribution 
made by the patient and the surgery’s operating expenses, doctors have a dis-
incentive to depart from their financer’s directives. As doctors are thus sub-
ordinate to their insurer, therapeutic freedom yields ground in the face of the 
insurers’ demands for profitability. In other words, under pressure from their 
insurer, it is in doctors’ interests to minimize services per patient (Chambare-
taud and Lequet-Slama 2002). 
The commodification of the health sector is based on the justifications of 
the market convention. For several decades, many theoretical and political 
currents have insisted on the superiority of the market organization, based 
on the pursuit of profit and on the capacity of providers to satisfy the chang-
ing preferences of the patients/consumers. In the liberal medicine sector, the 
inspired/domestic convention was a bulwark against commodification and a 
compromise with the market convention seemed out of reach. However, the 
emergence of the industrial convention facilitates the dissemination of the 
market convention. As Boltanski and Thévenot showed, the compromise be-
tween industrial and commercial worlds is particularly fruitful: “So-called 
Fordian or mass production systems are compromise arrangements that seek 
to reconcile the demands of efficient production, characterized by high 
productivity, with the need to satisfy a demand in the marketplace” (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006, 333). While the singularity of relationships linked to the 
inspired/domestic convention made it difficult to build a profitable market, 
the industrialization of care made it possible to define standardized products 
perfectly compatible with the deployment of a market world. 
From this perspective, the industrialization of healthcare seemingly accel-
erates commodification and its corollaries in terms of market segmentation, 
the reorganization of work, and inequalities for patients and doctors alike.  
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